Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry



Concern over regulated monopolies entering unregulated vertically-related markets is grounded in the incentives for such firms to cross-subsidize their unregulated enterprises or discriminate against competitors in the unregulated market. However, a prohibition against regulated monopolies offering related goods may forfeit the benefits of production by the most efficient provider. We take advantage of cross-sectional variation across geographic cellular markets to examine the empirical importance of these discrimination and efficiency effects. This cross-sectional variation takes three forms; differences in the percentage of interconnection facilities in a cellular market owned by each phone company, in the percentage of wireline end customers served by each local phone company, and in the percentage of the cellular companies equity owned by each local telephone company. Consistent with the discrimination hypothesis, greater ownership of interconnection facilities is associated with lower quality and lower and output of cellular phone service. However, consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, a greater fraction of customers served is associated with higher cellular quality and greater output. The estimated magnitudes of these effects imply that discrimination and efficiency effects of greater integration tend to be offsetting. Higher equity ownership in the cellular company by the phone company leads to higher prices (which is consistent with either hypothesis) and no discernable effect on quality or quantity.

Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors **NEW Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors By** Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry. Tags: Bureau of Economics. August 1997. Authors: David Reiffen **Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence** Abstract. To what extent are capital investments sunk costs? This question is addressed by examining the salvage values of discarded metalworking machinery. **Download PDF** Volume XLVIII September 2000 No. 3.

DISCRIMINATORY DEALING WITH DOWNSTREAM. COMPETITORS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CELLULAR. INDUSTRY*. **What Fraction of a Capital Investment is Sunk Costs? - Wiley Online** Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the . and in the percentage of the cellular companies equity owned by each local **Download as a PDF - CiteSeerX** Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors. Evidence from the Cellular Industry. eBay! **Laurence Schumann Federal Trade Commission** Bibliographic information. QR code for Discriminatory dealing with downstream competitors evidence from the cellular industry **Front Matter - JStor** Discriminatory Dealing With Downstream Competitors: Evidence From the Cellular The Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers in the Hospital Industry: A **Michael R. Ward - Google Scholar Citations** Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry. August 1997. Authors: David Reiffen, Laurence Schumann, and **none** Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry with discrimination (greater interconnection facility ownership concentration is **Working Papers Federal Trade Commission** antitrust agency appears well equipped to handle discrimination, but is poorly equipped to regulate the resulting from downstream competition by means of higher upstream profits, it will not the integrated local phone companies to discriminate against third parties (in this case, Evidence from the Cellular Industry. **Discriminatory dealing with downstream competitors evidence from the** Abstract. To what extent are capital investments sunk costs? This question is addressed by examining the salvage values of discarded metalworking machinery. **Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence** DISCRIMINATORY DEALING WITH DOWNSTREAM COMPETITORS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CELLULAR INDUSTRY* First Draft - August, 1996 This Draft **reading full article - Wiley Online Library Regulation and Third-Party Discrimination in the - Springer Link** The antitrust agency appears well equipped to handle . companies to discriminate against third parties (in this case, independent long-distance carri- ers). 7. Weisman fect downstream competition and regulation of the input price. competitors: Evidence from the cellular industry, Journal of Industrial Economics,. Vol. Discriminatory dealing with downstream competitors [electronic resource] : evidence from the cellular industry / David Reiffen, Laurence Schumann, Michael R. **Laurence Schumann - Google Scholar Citations** DISCRIMINATORY DEALING WITH DOWNSTREAM. COMPETITORS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CELLULAR. INDUSTRY*. David Reiffen,{ Laurence Schumann{ **Reports Federal Trade Commission** Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence From the Cellular Industry, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 48 (2000), pp. 253-88, (with L. **The Economics of Price Discrimination Telecom New Zealand** Discriminatory dealing with downstream competitors: Evidence from the cellular industry (Working papers - Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics) **Download as a PDF - CiteSeerX** DISCRIMINATORY DEALING WITH DOWNSTREAM COMPETITORS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CELLULAR INDUSTRY*. First Draft - August, 1996. This Draft **Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence** Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry with discrimination (greater interconnection facility ownership concentration is **REGULATION AND THIRD-PARTY DISCRIMINATION IN THE** Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular I . of the cellular companies equity owned by each local telephone company. **Abstract - Wiley Online Library** Find great deals for Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry by Federal Trade Commission (Paperback **Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence** Feb 22, 2010 Price discrimination occurs in many markets, both competitive and non-competitive, and downstream market, and upstream firms may use price .. The evidence shows that differential pricing is ubiquitous in industries that. **Auctions on the Internet: Whats Being Auctioned, and How** Abstract. This paper is an economists guide to auctions on the Internet. It traces the development of online auctions since 1993, and presents data from a